In my ministry school, I am entering my senior year which focuses on philosophy and theology. I expect to do quite well this year, to be honest. These are just things I'm good at. As I engaged in the home study this weekend, one of the issues that came up was that of the Cosmological Argument. The CA is basically the idea that the universe had to have a first cause, and that the best posit for this 'first cause' is an agent, and thus this proves, or at least lends credence to belief in, the existence of God.
I am loathe to get into the arguments in detail here. To learn more, in ascending order of scholarship and difficulty, you can read here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosmological_argument
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument/
http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/cosmological-arguments/
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/in-defense-of-the-kalam-cosmological-argument
My main goal here is to talk about two particular objections my study guide brought up, given to us by Bertrand Russell. In it Bertrand Russell brings up two points:
1) If everything that exists must exist because of some 'cause', and God exists, then God too must need some 'cause' to explain his existence. Thus the Cosmological Argument is set on a vicious regress.
2) Given (1), it must be reasonable to posit something existing forever. The universe is as good a candidate for something that eternally exists as any. The universe doesn't need some 'first cause', agent or otherwise, it could've always existed.
The thing that Russell fails to realize or address (I don't know which), is simply that we have varying intuitions about what kind of thing stand in need of explanation. Some facts 'cry out' for an explanation. Some facts do not. People can easily conceive of some things needing causes and other things they easily conceive of not having any cause at all. Take a simple example: "2+2=4". This simple, mathematical fact, doesn't strike me (and I doubt it strikes most people, if anyone) as in need of an explanation. People accept this as a brute fact, one that could not possible be false. Followers of Plato, of course, conceive of these things existing as abstracta, as some kind of timeless forms in an abstract world. Most necessary truths, truths that cannot conceivably be otherwise, strike us as standing 'in no need of explanation'.
In point of fact there are some necessary truths that DO cry out for explanation, at least to some people. Take this one: "every contingent being requires something other than itself to exist." This is an analytic truth, derived from the meaning of 'contingent', and it is no less hard and unchangeable as "2+2=4". But in fact it does require an explanation, for it requires an intelligible world in order to be true. So it stands in some kind of need for explanation.
Now we know that the physical existence of the universe does indeed require an explanation, because the quest for such an explanation is a basic component of the methodologies of modern theoretical physics. What is at issue is whether the physical laws on which that universe supervene 'cry out' for an explanation. Does it make sense to just accept them as existing necessarily? Or are they the kind of thing that must be explained, that must require some cause to make sense of their existence. In fact physicists themselves differ on this point. Some say 'yes' others say 'no'. Some believe that SOME of the laws exist necessarily, while others don't, and some think they all exist necessarily and without need for cause.
And what about God? Would God, if He exists, be the kind of thing that 'cries out' for an explanation. In point of fact, people have much more comfort just positing any spiritual being without the need for explanation. It is the physical universe that strike people as needing explaining. Once one has conceived of the spiritual, imagining its eternal existence isn't very hard. I have no problem imagining a world of many gods and spirits, where all of them have always been. But I have a much harder time conceiving of anything physical existing without cause or reason, though in point of fact, I do believe in an eternally existing physical universe (a consequence of my process theism).
The point is that our intuitions on these matters are unsure and uncertain. It seems reasonable to believe in an eternal universe, but it also seems reasonable to believe in a first cause of the universe, but not of God. We have many conflicting intuitions when it comes to the 'explanatory need' I've spoken of here. What is true is that for most people the physical almost naturally cries out for explanation, whereas the spiritual does not.
One last point to be made, this explanatory question extends to persons and purposes also. Most people take reasons as end points in a causal chain. "Why is there a pot of water boiling on the stove?" asks one person "Because I wanted tea", answers the other. Most people don't think any more explanation is required. A desire is the end of inquiry, for most. Of course many scientists do think are desires have antecedent causes, always, and they investigate those antecedent causes. Our very purposes stand in need of explanation for some, and not others. I am inclined to think that there are reasons that require causes and reasons that don't. Sometimes the causal chain ends with my decision. This, too, has some consequence when talking about God as First Cause.
Many of these thoughts are rough. I'm just thinking about what I would say to the teacher if I were talking to him. But those often produce the best results for a blog. Blogs are raw, not refined.
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